Another impressive reflection: everything you said on Socrates perfectly aligns him with Hegel and Zizek, just as you described. In Hegel, being doesn’t “become” nothing (this is only a movement of thought), but rather when we try to think being it is indistinguishable from nothing, and vice-versa, suggesting things “are” (be)coming, which I would align with your point that “oppositeness itself cannot be opposite.” Likewise, “becoming” cannot “becoming,” but doesn’t that mean becoming doesn’t become? Indeed, it must entail being somehow, which suggests “(be)coming,” and that means everything is really really really weird. Everything is a nothing to nothing, a no-foundation to a no-foundation, and that means everything is a relation between nothingness, which means being is relation between nothingness. Does this mean we speak of a “pure relation?” No, we speak of bunnies. Cute, fuzzy bunnies.
Another impressive reflection: everything you said on Socrates perfectly aligns him with Hegel and Zizek, just as you described. In Hegel, being doesn’t “become” nothing (this is only a movement of thought), but rather when we try to think being it is indistinguishable from nothing, and vice-versa, suggesting things “are” (be)coming, which I would align with your point that “oppositeness itself cannot be opposite.” Likewise, “becoming” cannot “becoming,” but doesn’t that mean becoming doesn’t become? Indeed, it must entail being somehow, which suggests “(be)coming,” and that means everything is really really really weird. Everything is a nothing to nothing, a no-foundation to a no-foundation, and that means everything is a relation between nothingness, which means being is relation between nothingness. Does this mean we speak of a “pure relation?” No, we speak of bunnies. Cute, fuzzy bunnies.