Re-description: Fact vs Value
The aim of re-description is not to destroy what we call ‘facts’ but to reimagine or introduce new relations. A skeptic may hear this demand as ‘relativistic’ and propose the idea that we should now call snakes ‘sticks’ to demonstrate how silly such a task is.The reason why this is not a nominal pursuit is because to call a snake a ‘stick’ creates no practical difference.
However, if one were to argue for a practical difference it might serve the alleviation of a person's phobia or fear. It is similar to the sentiment of when parents use colorful language to describe what they perceive as difficult realities for the child to handle. For example, death can be re-described as ‘moving on’ or ‘passing away’. The child, more or less understands what has happened but it serves the practical utility of ridding the parents of guilt for telling ‘hard truths’ or ameliorating the weight of the child's grief. Regardless of whether parents should tell children the ‘cold facts’ of the matter, it still serves a practical function.
What we call ‘facts’ are always interpretations of facts. For no bare fact exists alone. When we speak of death as a ‘bare fact’ people tend to hear that word in many registers. For some, death is what happens to mere finite beings. Death in this sense, means nothing more than the reality of our finitude. On the other hand, death can mean the coming of God's judgment where one's life is taken together and weighed as a whole.
To say that death is a ‘fact’ is only to say that death happens. Nothing else must necessarily be demanded. We can proceed with our lives as if death is something that happens and grieve when other people reach the same end. To argue that death is a necessary fact of life is tantamount to saying nothing at all. But what is meant by “necessary”, indicates a probable value that someone desires to communicate.
If we attempt to substitute the word ‘fact’ for ‘value’, we are granted the possibility of understanding the utility death can serve for people. Afterall, some could argue the only reason why facts matter is because we value them rather than not. One could then propose a quasi-euthyphro dilemma : Do facts matter because we value them, or do we value them because they matter independently of our valuing them?
The pragmatic response to this dilemma finds the fact/value distinction fruitless. We could easily argue in circles about how facts are distinct from values and yet beg the question of whether making such a distinction is a matter of value or of fact. Whereas we can remedy the issue by understanding that for some the distinction serves a specific purpose of navigating the fog of the world into a palpable clarity.
Others may argue that this relativizes too much and that this would never dismiss the reality of a flame burning you. A flame that burns is only a bare fact if we strip it of any essential context. A new context would be to imagine a person with flame resistant gloves handling fire. Clearly, in this case, we cannot say a flame ‘burned them’. If anything, facts are merely relations that help us add additional relations which conform to our interests and desires.
Facts are facts because prefer realities where we do not burn ourselves and manage to keep our skins intact (self-preservation is an interest of ours).We also prefer realities where death might mean the coming of something significant or simply that it happens rather than believe in a judgemental deity. The reality of re-description is not something that has to be seen as a fact or value but as a tool which can provide other ways of relating that were previously unanticipated. If it is true that we cherish facts or values, then re-description offers the possibility of discovering other ways of being that may lead us to pursue new interests rather than remain attached to our previous ones.