Introduction to Virtue
Virtue is known as aretē in Greek. It can also stand for excellence. Aretē, first and foremost, is a quality — a quality that can be applied to any object or activity. The difficulty in explaining aretē comes from how broad its scope is.
A painter can produce a work (ergon) of art, or they can produce a work of art well. The work itself only satisfies the basic capacity or purpose of the activity: to paint is to create something. But to do something well is to add something to the activity or object that is not considered essential to its function. A hammer can simply drive in a nail, or it can do so well — which may at first seem superfluous to us.
Aretē is accidental for Aristotle. It is not considered the essence of an activity or an object. Returning to the hammer analogy: nothing about the hammer’s being requires aretē as essential. A hammer can perform its function without excellence. A common example of an “accident” is color — an object might have been any color, but it happens to be blue, and its blueness does not define its essence.
Nevertheless, when aretē is applied to us, the conversation shifts. It arises when Aristotle asks the question: what is the ergon — the work — of a human being? Ultimately, he concludes that our work lies in the use of reason and our ability to conform our actions to it.
The question then becomes: what does it mean to do this well?