Between Socrates and Thrasymachus
In Plato’s Republic book one, we encounter the argument from Thrasymachus that to be just is the advantage of the stronger. Meanwhile, Socrates admits that he does not disagree that there is an advantage to being just. Towards the end of the book however, Socrates makes the argument that it would be impossible to achieve any greatness without some degree of justice between criminals or thieves.
Although Thrasymachus concedes to Socrates on this point, what is ironic about the conversation is that perhaps Plato is revealing to us the difference between appearing just and acting just. The argument from Thrasymachus is not entirely unconvincing but as Socrates reveals here, there is still something off about the argument.
Thrasymachus inverses Socrates' initial proposition by saying that people who are unjust have knowledge and virtue while people who are just, do not. Socrates clearly disagrees by his further questioning but what does become evident in the dialogue is that Thrasymachus is not entirely wrong. There is an advantage but perhaps the advantage is found in appearing to be just rather than unjust.
Following the argument from Socrates that thieves must have some degree of justice between themselves, there is no guarantee that it is not simply a ruse to achieve something greater for oneself. Meaning, the thieves or some of them can pretend to act just to achieve something great and then reveal themselves as unjust once the aim is accomplished.
In some ways, Socrates and Thrasymachus are not opposed but reveal a deep irony. Socrates’ main point is that there is no fundamental advantage to being unjust rather only justice is capable of this advantage. But then Thrasymachus’ argument reveals its brilliance in terms of the possibility of switching appearances where the unjust have virtue and knowledge while those who are just,do not.
Despite Socrates giving the possibility of error and ignorance for those who attempt to take advantage of those who must obey, it still reveals a possibility of disadvantage on the ruler’s side of the bargain. However, towards the end of book one, Socrates proceeds to admit that he still does not know what justice is nor what kind of virtue.
And if we restrict ourselves to book one solely, what we discover is a debate between the appearance of justice and justice itself. Which perhaps explains why certain behaviors like manipulation or bad intentions can be rather difficult to discern. For example, if we accept what Socrates and Thrasmachus argue about, it would reveal that acts like manipulation have the power and advantage that it does precisely because it appears to be just. Ironically, the better position ( if we restrict ourselves to book one) might be not knowing what justice is, granting us the possibility of discerning the appearance of justice (what is unjust) versus justice itself.
On the other hand, if we do claim to know what justice is, rather than the ambiguous notion that justice is good and beautiful. We succumb to the dialectical irony between the appearance of justice and justice itself. Primarily because the appearance of justice gains its force and advantage from justice itself. Making it possible for the unjust (those who appear just )to have virtue and the just (those who appear unjust) to have ignorance and vice.